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BOOK REVIEWS

present-day developments. Did not Goethe already complain in his Faust
that old laws are carried on beyond their time while there are as yet no new
laws to meet new conditions? To some extent any lawyer will always feel
that he is living in a period of basic changes.
Moreover, reservations to treaties began to be made at a time which
Kappeler considers as a period of stability of international law. I therefore
doubt whether any international law of the future would be able to dispense
with this institution the utility of which has been proved in a very respectable
number of cases-even in periods of relative stability of international law.
Therefore, even if we would accept Kappeler's view, that we are living in a
period of transition I assume that reservations to international treaties would
still continue to be with us as a "necessary evil" even when this period
should have come to an end one way or another.
Kappeler, at the end of his book, tests the various solutions proposed, especially as to whether they could easily be applied in practice. He contends that
all proposals made up to now to reform the classical rules concerning reservations fail this test. He therefore comes out in favor of a return to the classical pre-World War II rules on reservations, as laid down in the proposals
made by the Harvard Law School in 1935.
IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN *
*

Professor of Law, University of the Saar.

G.-SOHN, L. B. World Peace Through World Law. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958. Pp. 540.
Hardly any problem dealing with international law and organization has
received more attention in the last few years than that of the revision of the
United Nations Charter. The general understanding is that it needs amendments, with doubts expressed by some whether the time is appropriate to
change it now. Most criticisms have been directed to some particular supposed shortcomings of the Charter, and first of all-to the right of vetoing the
decisions of the Security Council. Only a few have suggested a more comprehensive revision of the structure of the international community.
The Clark-Sohn proposals have two outstanding features. The first important feature of the mature conclusions of the authors, long keen observers
of the United Nations and experts in international law and organizations,
laid down in World Peace Through World Law, is their comprehensiveness.
To achieve peaceful co-operation between nations it is insufficient to suggest
making an isolated step in one direction, even if it be the right one. Thus, it
is insufficient to proclaim disarmament and to forbid states to have recourse
to war. "The necessary corollary of such prohibition must be the assurance
that every state can get justice by peaceful proceedings."1 Different problems
which the international community is facing are interrelated, and in order
to achieve the goal of having peace through law, the revamping of the pattern
of relations among nations must proceed on a large scale.
In effect, the authors offer a thoroughly revised text of the Charter of the
CLARK,

1 Wagner, Is a Compulsory Adjudication of International Legal Disputes Possible?
47 N.U. Law Rev. 21, 22 (1952).
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United Nations, juxtaposed with the old one, largely glossed, explained and
commented, preceded by an enlightening introduction, and followed by
annexes. In spite of the scores of changes to the structure of the United Nations that the authors suggest, some of a fundamental nature and some trivial,
the old text of the Charter was retained as much as possible, whenever it
did not conflict with the basic assumptions of Messrs. Clark and Sohn. And
at this point, the other outstanding feature of the work must be emphasized:
its realism. The authors are cautious not to make idealistic proposals which,
good as they may be, have no chance of being adopted at the present stage of
the development of humanity. The so-called "sovereignty" of the states is
recognized, and is abridged only as far as it is necessary to achieve the
paramount purpose of the organization of nations: the replacement of
violence in international relations by settling disputes by peaceful means.
In this respect, the authors may even appear to be too conservative. In the
present Charter of the United Nations, the word "sovereign" or "sovereignty"
is used just once, in Art. 2, which states that "[t]he Organization is based
on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members." If taken in its
literal meaning, "sovereign" denotes "supreme." Thus, it could be argued that
the Charter speaks about supreme, or perfect, equality of states. The Charter
does not expressly recognize that its members are "sovereign," although it
does so implicitly, and nobody could contend that sovereignty was intended
to be eliminated. In spite of the fact that the whole idea has been often administered severe blows by the actual practice of nations, and that all outstanding modern international law scholars have demonstrated its senselessness and dangerousness,' states cherish the idea that they are omnipotent
and stick to it. Messrs. Clark and Sohn, realizing that nations are touchy on
the point, state, in their text of Art. 2, that "There are reserved to all nations
or their peoples all powers inherent in their sovereignty";' they hasten to add,
however, that some of these powers "are delegated to the United Nations."4
The authors make it clear that the scope of authority delegated to the
United Nations will be very restricted: it must be limited, for the time being,
to "matters directly related to the maintenance of peace."' Responsibility for
the maintenance of peace and the enforcement of disarmament lies in the
General Assembly, according to the proposals of Messrs. Clark and Sohn.
The place of the present Security Council is taken by a new body, the Executive Council, which is more comprehensive and includes seventeen representatives elected by the Assembly. Each of the four largest nations (China,
India, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.) are to be represented on the
Council; four of the eight next largest nations would also be represented in
rotation. The right to veto its decisions would be eliminated; there would
be substituted a qualified majority vote. The important organs of the organization, such as the Economic and Social Couricil and the Trusteeship Council
would be continued, and a few others would be called into being.
2See, e.g., Scelle, Droit International Public (1944); Jessup, A Modern Law of
Nations (1949).
'P. 6.

4Id.

r Introduction, at XIII.
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Peaceful settlement of international disputes, the paramount aim of the
Organization, would be achieved by three important devices, strictly interrelated: disarmament, a world police force, and an international judicial
system.
Annex I to the Charter lays down a plan for the complete elimination of
national armed forces. Full disarmament is suggested to be achieved over
a period of ten years (plus two preparatory years), by reducing each year the
strength of the armed forces by ten per cent. This process would be supervised
by a special Inspection Commission.
Annex II to the Charter provides for the organization and maintenance of
the United Nations Peace Force, which would supervise the abidance by the
nations of the pledge not to resort to violence in international relations. It
would consist of volunteers, full-time career soldiers, numbering from
200,000 to 600,000, as determined by the General Assembly. A Peace Force
Reserve is also provided for.
The world's judicial system would consist of one supreme tribunal, the
International Court of Justice, to adjudicate cases of legal nature; of a World
Equity Tribunal to pass on nonjusticiable disputes; and of a set of regional
United Nations Courts as well as a World Conciliation Board.
The authors, well aware of the importance of a steady, well-balanced
budget, call for a comprehensive fund-raising system and a budget amounting to two per cent of the gross world product. Although the estimated contributions of the nations may seem high, they would amount only to a fraction of their present expenses, most of which are wasted in the armament
race.
A most important problem, in all international bodies, is the one of representation. The traditional absurd rule of not only legal, but also factual,
equality of states, leading to the rule of one vote for each nation, must be replaced by a more reasonable one. Iceland or Luxemburg cannot be treated
as entitled to the same voice in international matters as the United States or
the U.S.S.R. In one of his previous publications, Professor Sohn gave a review
of different proposals on how to distribute the voting power in the future
world organization.' Different factors could be taken into consideration, the
most important being population and the national industrial potential. In
the new book, Messrs. Clark and Sohn recognize the difficulty of basing the
number of representatives from the several states in the. world organization
on any other consideration than their number of inhabitants. They would
give one representative to the smallest nations, and thirty to each of the four
biggest, having more than 140 million inhabitants. The authors point out the
inherent reasonableness of this approach. In one respect, however, the plan
seems to be deficient. It does not provide for a gradual increase of the number
of representatives according to population, but it proceeds by stiff brackets;
thus, a nation of from 5 to 20 million people would have 5 representatives in
the General Assembly; nations in the 20 to 40 million bracket would be entitled to eight; those having up to 140 million would be represented by sixteen.
There does not seem to be any necessity for such a procedure, and it is hardly
conceivable that Eastern Germany, Yugoslavia or Argentina, each having
6 Sohn, Cases and Other Materials on World Law (1950).
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nearly 20 million inhabitants, would consent to having the same number of
representatives as Iraq or Switzerland, which barely pass the borderline of
five million.
This seems to be the chief proposal of Messrs. Clark and Sohn which merits
criticism. A few minor points may raise some doubt, such-as, e.g., the suggestion that appeals from the regional international tribunals to the International Court of Justice should be only in cases of special importance instead
of being permitted as a matter of right,7 and that appeals from the decisions
of the Executive Council may be brought directly to the International Court
of Justice, by-passing the General Assembly.'
The new United Nations would not make its membership mandatory on
all nations; however, it would become effective only upon being accepted by
a qualified majority of the states, including all the large nations, and there
would be no right to withdraw or to expel a member.' Thus, practically, universality would be achieved. Here again, by not providing for compulsion, the
authors take national susceptibilities into consideration.
In providing for a system of control over the doings of the nations, the
authors proceed on the assumption "that mankind has not yet reached the
stage at which any nation can be trusted ...to observe even the most
solemn agreement to refrain from violence."'" There lies the crux of the
whole problem. The nations cannot be trusted. If it can barely be expected
that nations would observe their agreements, can it be hoped that they will
relinquish some of their powers deriving from their "sovereignty" and agree
to a plan under which they would be forced to abide by their agreements?
The future, and probably a not-too-distant one, will answer this question.
W. J. WAGNER

P. 41; p. 323, point 5.
25 at 73-74.
' Art. 6 at 16.
10 Introduction, at XXI.
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